Introduction
Social scientists have long wanted to understand the manner in which decision makers learn about and choose innovations. A common scenario envisions an initial condition in which decision makers choose among a set of actions with known attributes. At some point, a new alternative yielding unknown outcomes becomes available. From then on, successive cohorts of decision makers choose among the expanded choice set, with later cohorts observing the experiences of earlier ones and possibly learning from them.
It has often been conjectured, and sometimes observed, that the fraction of decision makers choosing the new alternative increases with time in the manner of an S-shaped curve -first rising slowly, then rapidly, and finally converging to some limit value (e.g., Griliches, 1957) . However, this certainly is not the only possible dynamic for adoption of an innovation. The fraction of decision makers choosing the new alternative could begin high and then decrease with time, or the time path could be non-monotone.
The shape of the time path of adoption should depend on the beliefs that decision makers hold when the innovation is introduced and on how those beliefs evolve as experience accumulates. Manski (2002) showed that processes of social learning can generate potentially complex time paths for the adoption of innovations. The present paper carries this work further. Section 2 reviews the general analysis of social learning in Manski (2002) and the specific findings on adoption of innovations. Section 3 reports a set of computational experiments that enrich understanding of the dynamics of information accumulation and decision making after introduction of an innovation. Section 4 examines the implications for the welfare of the population of decision makers. Section 5 concludes. Manski (2002) analyzes social interaction processes that stem from the successive endeavors of new cohorts of heterogeneous decision makers to learn from the experiences of past cohorts. The members of each new cohort observe the actions chosen and outcomes realized by past cohorts, and then make decisions that produce new experiences observable by future cohorts. I emphasize that decision makers face a basic identification problem, the selection problem, as they seek to learn from the experiences of others. The problem is that only the outcomes of chosen actions are observable; one cannot observe the outcomes that earlier decision makers would have experienced if they had selected other actions. The logical impossibility of observing counterfactual outcomes has long been recognized to pose a fundamental difficulty for empirical research in the social sciences. It is no less an impediment to social learning.
Social Learning from Private Experiences
I study the dynamics of information accumulation and decision making when new cohorts have no prior knowledge of the outcomes associated with alternative actions, nor of the decision processes of past cohorts. I assume that new decision makers must choose their actions at a specified time and cannot revise their choices once made. Thus, they cannot undertake learning-by-doing and cannot otherwise wait for empirical evidence to accumulate before making decisions. These simplifying assumptions imply that each decision maker faces a single choice problem with predetermined information. Thus, dynamics emerge purely out of the process of social learning across successive cohorts. Individuals do not themselves face dynamic choice problems.
The analysis assumes only one regularity condition and one form of prior information. The regularity condition is that, for each feasible action, successive cohorts of decision makers share the same distribution of outcomes. The informational assumption is that decision makers know about this stationarity. The stationarity assumption implies that empirical evidence accumulates over time, each successive cohort being able to draw inferences from a longer history of past experiences.
A medical illustration may help to envision the process of adoption of innovations under study here.
Suppose that each year persons who are newly diagnosed with an illness must choose a treatment. Originally, only one treatment was available. This treatment was the universal choice and so its properties could readily be learned by observation of its success rate in curing the illness. At some point, a new treatment with a priori unknown properties is introduced. From then on, persons diagnosed with the illness choose between the old treatment and the new one. There initially is no empirical evidence about the success rate of the new treatment, so the persons who first choose the innovation tend to be those who are either most "optimistic" (in a sense to be made precise) about its success rate or who have the lowest cost of treatment, relative to the alternative. As empirical evidence accumulates, persons who are less "optimistic" or who have higher cost of treatment may adopt the innovation. These processes tend to make the rate of adoption grow over time, but a countervailing force may exist to the degree that empirical evidence shows optimism about the new treatment to be unwarranted. Hence the rate of adoption of the new treatment may increase, decrease, or be non-monotone over time.
Section 2.1 summarizes the basic analysis of information accumulation. Section 2.2 considers how decision makers may use the available empirical evidence to choose actions. Section 2.3 applies the findings to the adoption of innovations. The propositions and corollaries stated below are taken directly from Manski (2002) and are proved there.
Information Accumulation
To begin, I formalize the idea of a succession of cohorts who learn from past experiences. Suppose that at each integer date T $ 1, each member of a cohort J T of decision makers must choose an action from a finite time-invariant choice set C. Each person j 0 J T has a response function y j (@): C 6 Y that maps actions into outcomes, which take values in space Y. Let z j 0 C denote the action chosen by person j. Then person j realizes outcome y j / y j (z j ). The counterfactual outcomes y j (c), c … z j are unobservable.
To formalize needed distributional concepts, let each cohort J T be a probability space, say (J T , S T , P T ), with S T the F-algebra and P T the probability measure. 2 A decision maker with a known choice set who wishes to maximize an unknown objective function is said to face a problem of choice under ambiguity. A common source of ambiguity is incomplete knowledge of a probability distribution describing a relevant population -the decision maker may know only that the distribution of interest is a member of some set of distributions. This is the generic situation of a decision maker who seeks to learn a population distribution empirically, but whose data and prior information do not suffice to identify the distribution. Thus, identification problems in empirical analysis induce ambiguity in decision making.
The study of choice under ambiguity dates back at least to Keynes (1921) and Knight (1921) , who used the term uncertainty. Ellsberg (1961) introduced the term ambiguity and posed the problem in a particularly evocative way through a thought experiment requiring subjects to draw a ball from either of two urns, one with a known distribution of colors and the other with an unknown distribution of colors.
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Corollary 1: Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let T $ 2 and c 0 C. Let 0 0 ' be a specified probability The characterization of the set of feasible distributions given in Proposition 1 is simple but abstract.
Corollary 1 gives a useful alternative characterization of /(T, c). The basic finding is that a distribution is feasible if and only if the probability it places on each measurable subset of Y is no less than an easily computed lower bound. This characterization is particularly useful when the outcome space Y is countable. How might a person behave in this setting? A pervasive idea in research on social learning has been that a person views himself as a member of some observable reference group and predicts that, if he were to choose a given action, he would experience an outcome drawn at random from the distribution of outcomes in this group. We can formalize this idea by assuming that person j views himself as a member of cohort J T , predicts that his outcome under each action c 0 C is drawn from P T [y(c)], and aims to solve the problem
Problem (4) expresses a limited-information version of the usual rational expectations model, one in which person j conditions his expectations only on the information that he belongs to cohort J T rather than on his full information set.
Elimination of Dominated Actions
Problem ( The upper bound on the expected utility of this action, given on the left side of (6a), decreases with T. The greatest lower bound of the expected utility of all actions, on the right side of (6a), increases with T. Hence action cN may be undominated at early dates but dominated later on. It is not possible for cN to be dominated early but undominated later.
Choice Among Undominated Actions
Assumption 3 leaves open how decision makers choose among undominated actions. There is no "optimal" way to make this choice, but many "reasonable" decision rules have been suggested over the years.
In particular, Wald (1950) proposed the maximin rule, which solves the problem
Hurwicz ( Requiring that P(u) be continuous ensures that indifference between actions e and n occurs with probability zero, so the model yields well-defined choice probabilities.
The Dynamics of Choice
Proposition 3 describes the time path of adoption of the innovation. 
The Terminal Information State
The terminal information state is determined by the stationary distribution of outcomes and decision rules. Some sense of the possibilities is given by considering the special case in which all persons have the same value of 8, y(n) is statistically independent of u, and u has support R 1 .
Let P(8 = L) = 1, where L 0 [0, 1]. Let b / P[y(n) = 1]. Let p t / P t (z = n), t $ 1. By (16), statistical independence of y(n) and u implies that for each T $ 2,
This and Proposition 3 yield
Inspection of (14) shows that the sign of (L + b -1) determines the qualitative dynamics of decision making and information accumulation. If (L + b -1) is positive, the probability of choosing the innovation increases with time. Thus max 1 # t # T -1 p t = p (T -1) and equation (19) reduces to
Recall that, by assumption, p 1 = 0. Hence equation (15) generates a monotone increasing rate of adoption whose limit as T 6 4 is the value pN yielding the smallest solution to the equation (16) Thus the qualitative dynamics of decision making and information accumulation depend critically on how decision makers choose among undominated actions. If they act pessimistically (i.e., L > 1 -b), the adoption rate of the innovation increases with time. If they act optimistically (i.e., L # 1 -b), the adoption rate begins high and then immediately falls to a steady state value. However decision makers behave, social learning takes place but remains incomplete.
Computational Experiments
Computational experiments with particular specifications of the time-invariant probability distribution P[y(e), y(n), u, 8] can enhance understanding of the model of adoption of innovations studied in Section 2.3.
The experiments reported here aim to illuminate how behavior under ambiguity affects information accumulation and decision making.
Experimental Design
The experiments fix many features of P[y(e), y(n) 3.2. Findings Figure 1 plots the time path for dates T = 2, . . . , 10 of adoption of the innovation in each of the nine cases specified above. Table 1 presents the same findings in numerical form. Figure 2 and Table 2 It is easy to see why Cases 3 and 7 yield the lowest and highest values for W 10 . The ambiguity parameter 8 and the outcome y(n) are strongly dependent in these cases. In Case 3, the persons who behave optimistically, and so tend to choose the innovation, tend have bad draws of y(n); those who behave pessimistically, and so tend to choose action e, tend to have good draws of y(n). Hence the members of each new cohort J T observe small values for the probabilities [P t (y = 1*z = n), t < T] that earlier decision makers who chose the innovation had good outcomes. In Case 7, the nature of the dependency between 8 and y(n) is reversed.
One perhaps unintuitive finding is that W 10 slightly exceeds W RG in Case 5, where 8 and y(n) are statistically independent. This ranking is possible, albeit hard to explain, because decision makers who behave according to Assumption 4 make choices using knowledge of [P t (y*z = n), t < T]. This information is not used in solving problem (4).
Conclusion
This paper has used computational experiments to shed further light on the theoretical analysis of the dynamics of social learning in Manski (2002) . These experiments illustrate quantitatively the qualitative theme, advanced in my earlier paper, that social learning from private experiences is a process of complexity within regularity. The process is complex because the dynamics of learning and the properties of the terminal information state flow from the subtle interaction of information accumulation and decision making. Yet a basic regularity constrains how the process evolves, as accumulation of empirical evidence over time (weakly) reduces the ambiguity that successive cohorts face.
Theoretical analysis and computational experiments are valuable in understanding complex economic processes, but I see a pressing need for new empirical research as well. In the present context, the critical empirical questions is how decision makers actually cope with ambiguity. It is clear that the way decision makers choose among undominated actions can critically affect the dynamics of learning and choice. An improved empirical understanding of decision making under ambiguity is necessary to guide theoretical and computational research in productive directions. T LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB 
